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ABSTRACT
A prototype dynamic testing harness for programmable automation systems has been specified and
implemented at the Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT). In order to get experience on the
methodology and equipment for the testing of systems important to the safety of nuclear power
plants, where the safety and reliability requirements often are very high, two different pilot systems
have been tested. One system was an ABB Master application, which was loaned for testing from
ABB Atom by Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO). Another system, loaned from Siemens AG (SAG) by
IVO International Oy (IVO), was  an application realized with SAG’s digital SILT technology. This
report describes the experiences gained in testing an APRM pilot system realized with ABB Master
technology.
The testing of the pilot application took place in the VTT Automation laboratory in Otaniemi in
September—October 1994. The purpose of the testing was not to assess the quality of the pilot
system, but to get experience in the testing methodology and find out the further development needs
and potentials of the test methodology and equipment.
The experience show that dynamic testing is one feasible way to get more confidence about the
safety and reliability of a programmable system that would be hard to achieve by other means. It
also shows that more development of the test harness is still needed, especially concerning the
comparison of the obtained test response to the expected response provided by the logical model of
the system and the user interface of the on-line part of the test harness. Methods for generation of
the test cases also need further development eg. for achieving statistical significance for the reliability
estimates.
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TIIVISTELMÄ
Ohjelmoitavien automaatiojärjestelmien dynaamiseen testaukseen tarkoitettu testiympäristö on
määritelty ja toteutettu Valtion teknillisessä tutkimuskeskuksessa (VTT). VTT on testannut kahden
järjestelmätoimittajan, ABB Atomin ja Siemens AG:n (SAG), koejärjestelmiä tässä ympäristössä.
Koejärjestelmät VTT:n käyttöön ovat toimittajilta lainanneet Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO) ja IVO
International Oy (IVO). Testausten tavoitteena on ollut kerätä kokemuksia testausmenetelmän ja
-järjestelmän soveltuvuudesta ydinvoimalaitosten turvallisuudelle tärkeiden järjestelmien (joiden
turvallisuus- ja luotettavuusvaatimukset usein ovat hyvin tiukat) arviointiin. Tämä raportti kuvaa
ABB Master-järjestelmällä toteutetun APRM-järjestelmän testausta ja tuloksia.
Testaus suoritettiin VTT Automaation laboratoriossa Otaniemessä syys-lokakuussa 1994. Testauksen
tavoitteena ei ole ollut arvioida koelaitteistojen laatua, vaan kerätä kokemuksia testimenettelystä ja
löytää menettelyn ja testilaitteiston kehitystarpeita ja -mahdollisuuksia.
Saadut kokemukset osoittavat, että dynaaminen testaus on eräs varteenotettava tapa lisätä
uskottavuutta kohdejärjestelmän luotettavuuteen ja turvallisuuteen, mitä muilla keinoilla on vaikeaa
saavuttaa. Ne myös osoittavat, että lisäkehitystä edelleen tarvitaan, erityisesti koskien mekanismeja,
joilla kohdejärjestelmän testitulosta verrataan sen loogisen mallin antamaan odotettuun vasteeseen.
Myös testipenkin on-line osan käyttöliittymää tulisi kehittää käyttäjäystävällisemmäksi.
Testitapausten generointi vaatii myös edelleenkehittelyä mm. testien perusteella laadittavan
luotettavuusarvion tilastollisen merkitsevyyden saavuttamista varten.
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TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ABB Master™ Programmable automation system by ABB Automation
ADC A/D Converter
A/D Analog/Digital
APRM Average Power Range Monitoring system
APROS Advanced Process Simulation System (IVO/VTT)
DAC D/A Converter
D/A Digital/Analog
Dynamic testing Testing of a system by execution of its functioning
EXCEL™ Spreadsheet program by Microsoft® Corporation
Expected response Correct response of the system to a specific test case
I/O Input/Output
IVO IVO International Oy
LPRM Local Power Range Monitoring system
RT/SA Real Time/Structured Analysis
RT-SA/SD Real Time-Structured Analysis/Structured Design
Test Harness (Test environment, test bed, test bench) System or device used for
running and automation of tests.
Test Oracle Logical model of the test object used for the calculation of the expected
(”correct”) response
TVO Teollisuuden Voima Oy
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The safety assessment of programmable auto-
mation systems can not totally be based on
conventional probabilistic methods because of the
difficulties in quantification of the reliability of
the software as well as the hardware. Additional
means shall therefore be used to gain more confi-
dence on the system dependability.
One central confidence building measure is the
independent dynamic testing of the completed
system. The testing is aimed at demonstrating that
the delivered system performs to its specification
and meets customer requirements, that there are
no functional errors in the software or the
hardware and that the system interacts effective-
ly (Abbot 1992). The operation of the system is
addressed in realistic situations, with realistic
operating conditions, with respect to the required
reliability. Testing is intended to demonstrate that
in a realistic situation, with real inputs, the system
will behave as required over a prolonged period
of time. Although the testing can not prove the
system to be safe, each successful test case can
increase the confidence about safety.
The ultimate goal of dynamic testing would be
to reveal all possible faults and errors. If the
knowledge about the system internal structure
together with some continuity, majority etc.
principle does not allow the extension of one
single test to cover a wider range of test cases, a
“complete” testing is required. This requires all
possible input and internal state combinations to
be covered. This is in practice not possible, since
even in systems with a limited number of inputs
and internal states the combination explosion
would raise the required number of test cases far
beyond any practical limits.
Another important goal is to define a statistical-
ly significant set of test cases for the estimation
of the system reliability. When the requirements
are very high, as is the case eg. for the reactor
protection system, even this significance usually
is hard if not impossible to fulfil.
In many cases only a limited time period is avail-
able for the testing before the system start-up,
and this time together with the performance of
the testing system set the upper limit for the num-
ber of test cases. Thus the practical goal would
be to define as many different test cases as can
be run during the limited time period available
for testing.
In any case a large amount of test cases should
be executed in order to get any confidence on
the system safety through testing. An automated
test harness is needed to run the required amount
of test cases in a restricted time span. A prototype
dynamic test harness was specified and imple-
mented at VTT (Haapanen & Korhonen 1994).
This system was used for experimental testing
of two representative pilot systems developed by
ABB Atom and Siemens AG. The purpose of the
testing was not to assess the quality of the pilot
system, but to get experience in the testing
methodology and find out the further develop-
ment needs and potentials of the test methodology
and equipment. Based on experience gathered the
system can later be expanded and completed to a
1 INTRODUCTION
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full-scope testing environment and used for
testing real safety critical nuclear power plant
applications when they eventually arise.
The basic configuration of the test harness is
presented in Fig. 1. The central part of the system
is the “Test Oracle”, a logical model of the test
object used to form the expected, “correct”
behaviour of the system output signals for the
test signals feeded to the test object. The test data
generator is actually an input driver feeding input
signal values from a predefined test data file to
the test object and the test oracle. The result
comparator compares the outputs from the test
oracle and the test object. An EXCEL spreadsheet
has been used to store the output signal time series
from the test object and test oracle are and the
comparison is made eg. by drawing charts of the
time behaviours. In practice the system is divid-
ed into two parts. The on-line part consists of an
industrial PC computer with proper I/O devices
to feed the input signals to the test object and to
read the test object output signals to a data file.
The generation of the expected output signals by
the test oracle and result comparison are made
off-line on separate PC-level computers.
This report describes the testing of a pilot system
realized with ABB Master technology. The testing
took place in VTT in Otaniemi in September-
October 1994.
Figure 1. The principle of the test concept.
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The pilot system was a restricted part of a reactor core power range
monitoring system (PRM) configured on an ABB Master automation system.
It was based on the specifications of a complete system installed in the
Barsebäck plant in Sweden (TVO also is considering replacing the existing
electronic APRM system in Olkiluoto plants with similar technology some
time in the future). In the following the tested application and the used ABB
Master equipment are described.
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Figure 2. Location of LPRM sensors in the core. Figure 3. Radial location of LPRM-sensors of
one SUB.
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2 THE PILOT SYSTEM
2.1 The pilot application
The tested pilot application realizes some central
parts of an Average Power Range Monitoring
(APRM) System for a BWR nuclear power plant.
The technical specifications of the Barsebäck
APRM system are used as basis for the imple-
mentation of the pilot application (ABB 1988,
Andersson 1993).
The APRM system surveys the local power dis-
tribution and the total thermal power of the
reactor core. The reactor core is equipped with
local neutron flux sensors (LPRM ~ Local Power
Range Monitoring) distributed over the core as
shown in Fig. 2 & 3 (an example from the TVO
plant). The sensors are located in different radial
positions each having 4 sensors at different
heights in the core. The APRM signals are used
10
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to produce trip commands for the reactor power
set-back and the reactor scram functions1 if
allowed power limits are exceeded. The trip limits
depend on the main coolant flow (HC-flow)
through the reactor core as indicated in Fig. 4.
The system is divided in 4 totally independent
subsystems (SUB’s) making their own partial trip
signals combined then by a voting logic.
The real pilot system implements only one SUB
of the APRM system with 20 LPRM measure-
ments and reduced functionality. Only two trip
limits, the fast power set-back (E5) limit and fast
reactor scram (SS10) limit are realized in the
system, and lower filtered limits of the actual
system are left out (see Fig. 4). This makes the
system static so that the output is all the time
Figure 4. Reactor protection system limits SS10 and E5 as functions of the core coolant flow.
1 Power set-back = reactor power is lowered by reducing the speed of core coolant circulation pumps.
Reactor scram = reactor is shut down by inserting control rods to the core.
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directly determined by the momentary input
values without any inherent dynamic behaviour
(memory) of the system itself (the filtered limits
would have made the system dynamic and thus
much more complicated to predict).
The signal levels of the neutron flux sensors are
weakening during their lifetime by a factor of
ca. 10, and in actual system periodical calibration
by increasing the amplification of signals is
needed. In the pilot system the amplification
coefficients were constants and the influence of
their change on system behaviour was not tested.
The basic functions included in the pilot system,
as well as the logical model, are shown in Fig. 5.
The tasks of the system are (the tasks are shown
as bubbles in the Fig. 5, the arrows are
information flows):
1) to calculate the average power range value
(APRM) from 20 local power range values:
APRM = 1
20 LPRMi=1
20
i➥
2) to compare the calculated APRM value to
HC-flow dependent trip limits (E5 & SS10)
and to give the trip signal if either of these is
exceeded.
The trip signals are called “reactor-scram”-signal
and “power set-back”-signal. The system has thus
only 2 outputs. The output signal is ‘1’ if the
corresponding trip limit is surpassed and ‘0’
otherwise (De-energized trip condition is used
in the acutal system i.e. the signal values are
inverted).
Figure 5. High-level logical model of the APRM system.
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2.2 The pilot equipment
The pilot application was implemented on a small
ABB Master system, which consisted of a process
control unit ABB MasterPiece 200 (MP200) and
a programming aid MasterAid 215.
MP200 is a complete process station unit for logic
sequencing, data processing, arithmetic, re-
porting, logging of process data, weighing, motor
speed control, positioning, regulatory control,
adaptive control, optimizing, etc. The unit
contains all that is needed for the entire control
task, e.g. a process database which contains all
the information on the process signals and objects
connected to it. The hardware composition of the
pilot MP200 unit is presented in Fig. 6.
MasterAid 215 is a computer based unit for con-
figuring, application programming, documenting,
testing and commissioning of an ABB Master
system. The system uses a specialized pro-
gramming language AMPL (ABB MasterPiece
Language) for the development of the application
programs. These are developed by selecting and
interconnecting function blocks from the system
library. A comprehensive set of function blocks
from simple logic gates up to loop, motor and
valve controllers is available in the Master
system.
The program is loaded from a PROM memory
(read only) of the MP 200. The state of the
incoming analog signals are updated in the data
base of the MP 200. The application program
could not be modified in this application, but
some parameters had to be defined to the read-
write memory (RAM) of the unit. These are the
amplification factors of the data base modules
of the neutron flux and recirculation flow signals.
The amplification factors depend on the process
for which the system is applied.
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Figure 6. The components of the pilot MP200 unit.
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As the source of the test data in this limited
experimental testing a simple reactor core model
acquired from TVO was used. This model
provides plant data that is not real but realistic
enough for testing of the functionality and
correctness of the pilot application. The core
model is implemented on EXCEL and is presen-
ted in Fig. 7.
The model calculates the total thermal power of
the reactor core (APRM) as the function of the
core coolant flow (HC-flow) and the control rod
position using a point kinetic neutron flux model.
The model contains no core thermohydraulics so
the void feedback was not included. The
individual local power range monitoring system
(LPRM) measurement signal values are cal-
culated by multiplying the total thermal power
by constant radial and axial flux shape factors
for each sensor. The radial shape factors RSH is
calculated as:
RSHi,j = 1—0,35*Ri,j2,
where Ri,j is the relative distance of the i,j-sensor
from the vertical central axis of the core (i
indicates the radial and j the axial position of the
sensor).
For the axial shape factors ASH the following
values are used:
ASHi,1 = 0.6, upper
ASHi,2 = 0.8, upper middle
ASHi,3 = 1.0, lower middle
ASHi,4 = 0.8, lower
Individual sensor value is then calculated as:
LPRMi,j(t) = APRM(t)*RSHi,j*ASHi,j
The model calculates the values of all LPRM
signals at constant time intervals; in the actual
calculation a 100 ms time step was used. The
calculated values are scaled to a 0—250 %
relative scale and stored as ASCII values (CSV
form) in the test data table as illustrated in Fig.
8. The core coolant flow scaled to 0—8 800 kg/s
is also stored to the same table. As the pilot system
uses a 20 ms time step, the actual values feeded
to the test object are interpolated from the data
table.
Two different sets of basic transient cases were
calculated using the EXCEL model. In one set
the core coolant flow was kept at a constant value
3 TEST CASES
Figure 7. Point kinetic model of the reactor core (TVO).
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and the control rods were moved so much out of
the core, that the average thermal power slightly
exceeded the reactor scram limit SS10 (“rod
transients”). This set included eight (denoted as
F3—F10) cases with different flow values rang-
ing from 31 to 100 % of the nominal value 8 800
kg/s. The other set actually included only one
case, where the control rods were kept at constant
insertion depth and the coolant flow increased
from 57 % to 98 % of nominal value (“flow
transient”; FF). The initial control rod position
was adjusted so that the thermal power was
100 %. On the flow/flux-diagram this cor-
responds the normal operation point near the
turning point of the flow/flux limit border. The
reactor protection system was switched off during
the transients so that the actual power limitation
and reactor trip limits could be exceeded.
Otherwise the protection system — if operating
correctly — would have decreased the reactor
power immediately after the power surpasses first
time the power set-back limit E5, and the
operation of the reactor scram at limit SS10 would
never been tested.
These nine (9) data sets served as base cases for
the testing of the application. More actual test
cases were then generated by adding pseudo-
random signal noise on the calculated LPRM-
signals. The maximum amplitude of the noise was
adjusted to be 4 % of the nominal power and the
dominating frequency around 0.4 Hz corre-
sponding the actual situation in an operating
BWR-plant.
3.1 Test cases without noise
The input-files for test-cases without noise have
100 rows. The rows contains the HC-flow value
and 20 LPRM detector values. The columns of
the input data table contain the momentary input
signal values with 100 ms time samples. As the
input signals to the model and the pilot system
are updated with 20 ms sample intervals, the
intermediate values are interpolated from the 100
ms values during the execution of the actual test
runs.
Test data values are scaled so that LPRM values
between 0 and 1 correspond to 0—250% of
nominal power (i.e. when all LPRM values are
at 100 % the calculated APRM value corresponds
the nominal thermal power of the reactor) in
actual LPRM, HC-flow values between 0 and 1
correspond to 0—8800 kg/s in actual HC-flow.
Figure 8. The principle of making the test data table.
Core
point
model
Power
distribution
model
Control
rod
position
APRM
Core
coolant
flow
. . . . .
LPRM i,j
{7,8,17,21,27} i
j {1,2,3,4} 
ASCII data
table (CSV)
˛
˛
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Table I. A part of an input data file without noise.
HC-flow LPRM7.1 LPRM7.2 LPRM7.3 LPRM7.4 LPRM8.1 LPRM8.2 ....
0.9 0.278644 0.371525 0.464406 0.371525 0.282752 0.377002 ....
0.9 0.287839 0.383785 0.479731 0.383785 0.292082 0.389443 ....
0.9 0.296115 0.394819 0.493524 0.394819 0.300480 0.400640 ....
0.9 0.303563 0.404750 0.505938 0.404750 0.308038 0.410718 ....
0.9 0.310266 0.413688 0.517110 0.413688 0.314840 0.419787 ....
0.9 0.316299 0.421732 0.527165 0.421732 0.320962 0.427950 ....
0.9 0.321729 0.428972 0.536215 0.428972 0.326472 0.435296 ....
0.9 0.326616 0.435487 0.544359 0.435487 0.331431 0.441908 ....
0.9 0.331014 0.441351 0.551689 0.441351 0.335894 0.447858 ....
0.9 0.334972 0.446629 0.558286 0.446629 0.339910 0.453214 ....
.... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
(100 lines altogether)
Basename of the input file is: f9
Output voltages, cycle time (ms) is : 20
Cycle      LPRM7.1    LPRM7.2    LPRM7.3    LPRM7.4    LPRM8.1    ....   Flow
1     2.78630    3.71430    4.64470    3.71430    2.82780    ....  9.0012
2     2.78140    3.83150    4.63740    3.80460    2.94020    ....  9.0012
3     2.80340    3.91450    4.78140    3.76310    2.76920    ....  9.0012
4     2.87420    3.78020    4.79610    3.63370    2.64960    ....  9.0012
5     2.66670    3.98290    5.20880    3.68500    2.75700    ....  9.0012
6     2.69110    3.97310    5.23080    3.62880    2.69350    ....  9.0012
7     2.74970    3.87060    5.20630    3.88280    2.82780    ....  9.0012
8     2.76920    4.10260    5.11360    3.77050    2.65690    ....  9.0012
9     2.89380    4.08790    4.99150    3.61420    2.98170    ....  9.0012
10    3.01100    4.16360    4.91330    3.88770    2.72280    ....  9.0012
11    3.11110    3.99760    5.01100    3.76310    2.74730    ....  9.0012
12    3.18930    3.93160    5.16970    3.62150    2.87420    ....  9.0012
   ....    ....    ....    ....    ....    ....    ....    ....
(5*500 lines altogether)
Table II. A part of an input data file with noise.
3.2 Test cases with noise
The test data input files with noise have 2 500
rows containing five consecutive test runs
generated so that in each single 500 rows long
test run different pseudorandom noise values have
been added to the same LPRM base data. The
base data containing signal values with 100 ms
samples is firstly interpolated to contain 20 ms
samples and then the noise is added to each value.
The rows contain the 20 LPRM values and the
HC-flow value scaled directly to voltage values
betveen 0—10V in LPRM value corresponding
to 0—250% in actual LPRM signal level, 0—
10V in HC-flow value corresponds to 0—8800
kg/s in actual HC-flow.
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Fig. 9 and 10 give examples of the input signals
with and without noise in two different test cases.
In Fig. 9 the HC-flow has been kept at a constant
value 0.9 and control rods are moved, in Fig. 10
control rods are kept at constant position and HC-
flow increased. Only 3 LPRM signals and the
Figure 9. Time series of three neutron flux sensor signals in a control rod transient.
Flow = 0.9, control rod 1 --> 1.35
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Figure 10. Time series of three local neutron flux sensor signals in an flow transient.
APRM signal (corresponding the average of all
LPRM values) are presented in order to keep the
graphs readable. Upper part of the graphs present
the test data without noise, in the lower part the
first 500 rows long test run with noise is
presented.
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4.1 Development of the logical
model
The development of the test oracle was based on
the requirements specification of the Power
Range Monitoring of the ABB-pilot system
(ASEA ATOM 1988). The details of the
requirements were further discussed with TVO.
The test oracle consist of a logical model of the
system together with C-coded input- and output-
functions. The logical model was developed by
using PROSA structured analysis design tool
(Prosa 1989). ReaGeniX code generator was then
used for automatically generating C-code from
this logical model (ReaGeniX Programmer
1994). The development of the logical model was
straightforward because the state-behaviour of the
modelled system is very limited.
The first version of the test oracle was quite large
as it modelled the whole system requirement
specification including for example flow-filtering
and alarms for local power range values.
However, the actual version of the APRM system
turned out to be a simplified version of the APRM
system containing only the non-filtered trip limits
SS10 and E5 (see Fig. 4). Therefore the test oracle
was adapted to correspond the reduced system.
The data flow and state transition diagrams of
the logical model are presented in App. A.
4.2 Validation of the logical
model
The logical model was in the early phase of the
project validated by comparing results obtained
from it to results obtained by manually executing
the specification. Errors were immediately
corrected to the logical model. Later the
validation method was augmented with automatic
comparison of the test results. In the comparison
the output of the logical model was automatically
compared to the “correct” results (see Fig. 11).
The test system also reported of any differences
between the results. This automated comparison
speeded up the testing of the logical model
significantly.
Finally the logical model was compared to the
model of the reactor protection system also
included in the TVO’s EXCEL-model. This
model was also used for generating the actual
test cases for ABB-pilot. Comparisons show that
the responses of the logical model correspond
precisely to responses of the EXCEL-model.
4 TEST ORACLE
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read_inputs
.2
print_outputs
.3
compare
.4
all prosessing
.5
infile.txt
results.txt
input buffer
stdout
At start
.6
ABB Logical Model
all input
all output
"Input file:"
"Expected results:"
all output
Figure 11. Validation testing of the logical model.
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• Power set-back limit E5 has been exceeded
on cycle nr. 70 at 1.4 seconds after the start
of the transient; APRM value was 121.018 %
• Reactor scram limit SS10 has been exceeded
on cycle nr. 219 at 4.38 seconds after the start
of the transient; APRM value was 132.005 %
The output file for test cases including noise is
in principle similar, but if the power is increased
slowly (as was case in the specified test cases),
much more events are recorded as the APRM
value exceeds and the again falls below the trip
limits due to the noise. An example in this case
is given in Tab. IV. In this special case the file
contains 83 events; the number of events in all
recorded cases varied from 34 to 134. The
responses of the logical model are presented in
graphical form in App. B together with the actual
responses of the pilot system.
As there were no timers in the logical model, the
execution of test cases was totally independent
of real-time. This means that a new input was
fed into the model as soon as the response from
the previous input was received. Thus the
execution rate was tens of times faster than in
the pilot system.
The generation of the expected response for the
test cases was done by executing the test cases in
the logical model in a similar manner as the
validation of the model was done. The actual
logical model of the pilot system was enhanced
with some new functions that were used for
reading the inputs from an input file (infile.txt in
Fig. 11 ) and storing the response of the model
into an output file (results.txt in Fig. 11).
The test input data files were read as text files
(see Tab. I and II) to the PC-computer where the
logical model was executed. The output values
of the logical model were stored into the output
file each time when the calculated APRM value
crosses one or the other of the trip limits i.e. the
status of either of the trip signals change. The
output file contains the number of the cycle and
the exact event time of the change and the states
of the trip signals at that moment of time. The
file also gives the exact value of the APRM signal
at the event time.
An example of the logical model output file in a
rod transient without noise is given in Tab. III.
As can be seen from Tab. III, only two events are
recorded:
5 EXPECTED RESPONSE GENERATION
21
STUK-YTO-TR 92
FINNISH CENTRE FOR RADIATION
AND NUCLEAR SAFETY
Table III. Response of the logical model to a rod transient without noise, HC-flow = 0.7.
Output # 70: time: 1400 ms
APRM: 121.018163
APRM alarms, h1 (E5): 1
APRM alarms, h2 (SS10): 0
Output # 219: time: 4380 ms
APRM: 132.005300
APRM alarms, h1 (E5): 1
APRM alarms, h2 (SS10): 1
Table IV. Response of the logical model to rod transient with noise, HC-flow = 0.7.
     Output # ; 65; time ;1300; ms APRM ;122.253000; ss10:  ;0; E5:    ;1;
     Output # ; 68; time ;1360; ms APRM ;117.863500; ss10:  ;0; E5:    ;0;
     Output # ; 69; time ;1380; ms APRM ;121.984000; ss10:  ;0; E5:    ;1;
     Output # ; 72; time ;1440; ms APRM ;119.349875; ss10:  ;0; E5:    ;0;
     Output # ; 73; time ;1460; ms APRM ;121.978250; ss10:  ;0; E5:    ;1;
     Output # ;162; time ;3240; ms APRM ;132.008750; ss10:  ;1; E5:    ;1;
     Output # ;170; time ;3400; ms APRM ;131.068375; ss10:  ;0; E5:    ;1;
     Output # ;177; time ;3540; ms APRM ;132.722750; ss10:  ;1; E5:    ;1;
     Output # ;179; time ;3580; ms APRM ;130.286875; ss10:  ;0; E5:    ;1;
     Output # ;192; time ;3840; ms APRM ;132.566875; ss10:  ;1; E5:    ;1;
     ........
     (83 lines altogether)
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The connection of the test harness to the test
object is presented in Fig. 12. The 21 analog
output signals from the test harness (test input)
and 2 binary output signals from the pilot system
back to the harness were hard wired to the
terminal block located in the backside of the
MP200. The analog signals were connected
through D/A converter channels directly to the
analog inputs of the test object as 0 - 10 V signals.
The two binary output signals from the pilot
system are connected to the test harness binary
inputs through opto-isolators in order to prevent
electrical interferences between systems and
adapt the different voltage levels. To avoid
electrical disturbances, the MP200 was connected
to an uninterruptible power source (UPS) during
the tests.
The analog inputs to the test object consist of
twenty LPRM signals and the core coolant flow
signal. Test object produces two binary output
signals, the reactor scram signal SS10 and the
power set-back signal E5.
The original test data tables from the ECXEL
model contained the input data with 100 ms
sample intervals and the individual LPRM values
were listed in numerical order. These tables were
arranged off-line to separate files each containing
the time series of one input signal as presented
in Fig. 13.  These files (21 pieces, 20 LPRM files
and one HC-flow file) were stored in the on-line
test harness computer, which did the scaling to
proper values for the D/A conversion, necessary
interpolation to the desired sample intervals and
possible addition of pseudorandom noise to the
APRM signals and finally wrote the data to the
input registers of the D/A converters. The on-
line part of the test harness operated in real time
updating the signal values with 20 ms time
intervals.
The on-line system sensed the status of the pilot
system output E5 and SS10 continuously with
0.01 ms time resolution and saved the exact time
of the event always when one of the signals
changed its state.
6 TESTING ARRANGEMENT
23
STUK-YTO-TR 92
FINNISH CENTRE FOR RADIATION
AND NUCLEAR SAFETY
Figure 13. Preparing and feeding of the test data to the test object and reading the system response.
Figure 12. Configuration of the test arrangement.
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7.1 Test cases without noise
An example of the pilot system output file in a
test case without noise is given in Tab. V. The
table contains the cycle index, the elapsed time
from the beginning of the transient and the status
of the binary inputs to the test harness recorded
each time when one of the inputs has changed its
state. The last bit in the digital output byte in Tab.
V is the status of the power set-back signal E5
and the second last the status of the reactor scram
signal SS10. The six most significant bits are non-
relevant in this case.
The corresponding output file of the logical
model in the same test case is presented in Tab.
VI.
The response of the pilot system resembles the
logical model predictions quite well in most test
cases, although there seems to be a tendency of
the pilot system events (event is a change in the
state of one of the trip signals) to become
registered somewhat later than the logical model
has predicted. The event times predicted by the
logical model and actually recorded in the tests
and their time differences are presented in Tab.
VII.
7 TEST RESULTS
The pilot system output was compared to the logical model output (“the correct
response”) manually by comparing the output file listings. This was considered to
be the most suitable way to do the comparison as the number of the test cases is
small. The test input data and the responses of the pilot system and the logical
model are also presented in graphical form in App. B, which makes the comparison
easier especially in the case of test signals containing noise.
Index :  55 elapsed time (ms) : 1093.90  digital input : 11111101
Index : 331 elapsed time (ms) : 6633.20  digital input : 11111111
Table VI. Response of the logical model to rod transient without noise, HC-flow = 0.9.
Table V. Response of the pilot system to rod transient without noise, HC-flow = 0.9.
Output # 52: time: 1040 ms
 APRM: 121.100210
 APRM alarms, h1 (E5):    1
 APRM alarms, h2 (ss10):  0
Output # 293: time: 5860 ms
 APRM: 132.000670
 APRM alarms, h1 (E5):    1
 APRM alarms, h2 (ss10):  1
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Table VII. Event times and time differences in transients without noise [ms].
Figure 14. Timing errors caused by quantification inaccuracies.
E5 SS10
Transient    Model    Pilot    Difference        Model      Pilot Difference
F3    1560   1577.43  17.43    5080     5232.64   152.64
F4    1560   1604.29  44.29    4880     4903.81   23.81
F5    1580   1629.47  49.47    4600     4669.07   69.07
F6    1580   1625.27  45.27    6040     6544.62   504.62
F7    1400   1447.42  47.42    4380     4506.96   126.96
F8    1220   1270.70  50.70    4080     4210.32   130.32
F9    1040   1093.90  53.90    5860     6633.20   773.20
F10    760     783.92  23.92    3580     3663.54   83.54
FF    800     828.90  28.90    1200     1228.81   28.81
FF    9400   9627.62  227.62 5740     5828.07 88.07
Some of the time differences (1 or even two 20
ms time steps) can be explained by the asynchro-
nous operation of the pilot system and the test
harness and the settling times of the D/A and A/D
converters in the signal path. If the time moment
when the test harness writes a value to the D/A
input register takes place after the time moment
the pilot system reads the corresponding input
channel the potential event can be discovered by
the pilot system at the earliest at the next time
step.
The larger time differences can be explained by
the inaccuracies in the analog signal path from
the test harness to the test object. Small
differences in the data feeded to the logical model
and the test object were caused e.g. by the use of
uncalibrated analog output boards in the test
harness, the limited resolution of the D/A and A/
D conversions (e.g. 12 bit converter in the test
harness) etc. These differences could be avoided
by feeding the logical model with the actual
measured values from the test object using a
standard EXCOM-protocol. The smaller is the
time gradient of the input signals at the time of
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Table VIII. Response of the pilot system to rod transient with noise, HC-flow = 0.9.
Index :  48 Total time (ms) :  945.08 digital input :11111101
Index :  50 Total time (ms) :  984.88 digital input :11111100
Index :  54 Total time (ms) : 1065.07 digital input :11111101
Index : 151 Total time (ms) : 3004.78 digital input :11111111
Index : 156 Total time (ms) : 3104.62 digital input :11111101
Index : 160 Total time (ms) : 3184.76 digital input :11111111
Index : 164 Total time (ms) : 3264.61 digital input :11111101
Index : 173 Total time (ms) : 3444.74 digital input :11111111
Index : 183 Total time (ms) : 3644.55 digital input :11111101
Index : 199 Total time (ms) : 3964.66 digital input :11111111
......
(59 lines altogether)
event, the larger is the possible time difference
caused by the same signal difference. In extreme
cases the time difference may grow to the infinity,
that is, an event in one system (pilot or model) is
not observed in the other system at all. This
principle is illustrated in Fig. 14. Since the test
transients were selected so that the reactor scram
limit SS10 was just exceeded, the time gradient
of the APRM value is much lower at the SS10
limit than as the power set-back limit E5.
Therefore also the time differences are bigger in
the SS10 signal.
7.2 Test cases with noise
An example of the pilot system output file in a
test case with noise is given in Tab. VIII. The
table is in principle similar than in test cases
without noise, but there are much more events
recorded. The noise causes the APRM value
exceed the trip limit and return back below the
limit again several times. The transients are
adjusted just to exceed the SS10 limit and
therefore there are more changes of state in SS10
signal than in E5 signal.
The corresponding output file of the logical
model in the same test case is presented in Tab.
IX.
There were problems in comparing results from
the ABB-pilot and from the logical model,
because the responses are quite different as can
be seen from Tab. VIII and IX and also from the
graphs in App. B. The main difference is that the
logical model predicts much more events than
are actually observed in the pilot system. For
instance in the selected example cases, the pilot
system produced 59 events when the logical
model predicted 134 events. This result — that
the number of trip limit crossings was much
greater in the logical model than in the ABB pilot
system — was noticed in all test cases with noise.
This difference appears to be caused by analog
signal filtering at the input of the pilot system.
The “technical specification for quotation” used
as the basis for the logical model did not specify
the filtering of the input signals, and therefore
the behaviour of the logical model deviates in
this respect from the pilot system behaviour. The
design documents produced in the later phase of
the design process would have defined these
filters, but they were not available for this study.
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Table IX. Response of the logical model to rod transient with noise, HC-flow = 0.9.
Output # ; 47; time ; 940; ms APRM ; 124.477750;ss10: ;0; E5: ;1;
Output # ; 48; time ; 960; ms APRM ; 119.352875; ss10: ;0; E5: ;0;
Output # ; 54; time ;1080; ms APRM ; 122.832625;ss10: ;0; E5: ;1;
Output # ; 55; time ;1100; ms APRM ; 119.767875; ss10: ;0; E5: ;0;
Output # ; 56; time ;1120; ms APRM ; 122.167375;ss10: ;0; E5: ;1;
Output # ;150; time ;3000; ms APRM ; 133.681125; ss10: ;1; E5: ;1;
Output # ;151; time ;3020; ms APRM ; 131.694000;ss10: ;0; E5: ;1;
Output # ;154; time ;3080; ms APRM ; 132.273875;ss10: ;1; E5: ;1;
Output # ;155; time ;3100; ms APRM ; 130.879125;ss10: ;0; E5: ;1;
Output # ;159; time ;3180; ms APRM ; 133.684500;ss10: ;1; E5: ;1;
......
(134 lines altogether)
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No major problems were found in developing the
logical model for the ABB pilot system. Though
ReaGeniX is especially intended for embedded
systems, it proved to be flexible enough for
modelling automation systems, too. The amount
of work that was used for model development
and testing, was approximately 2,5 manmonths.
Compared to the other pilot experiment, the effort
was larger although the model is much simpler,
but this can be explained by two reasons. Firstly,
the persons involved in the development had to
be changed so that creation of the model and
testing of the model were done by different
persons. Although the change of personnel
probably increased the correctness of the model,
it also increased the amount of work. Secondly,
the model that was once created and tested, had
to be updated due to the simpler implementation
of the pilot system. It later turned out that the
many features of the original specification had
been omitted in the pilot system, and therefore
the missing features had also to be eliminated
from the logical model. However, taking into
account the previous reasons, the total amount
of work can be considered reasonable.
The pilot application was too simple to give a
full comprehension about the potentials of the
selected modelling methodology, e.g. a cor-
responding logical model was also included in
the EXCEL model used for the development of
the test data. One can estimate that the imple-
mentation of this ECXEL model of the actual
pilot system functionality can not take many
manhours of work effort.
Those rather few test-cases used in this com-
parison show clearly that the responses of the two
systems are not identical. However, this does not
directly indicate that there were errors in the pilot
system or in the logical model, but a closer look
at the discrepancies is needed. For example, all
differences in test data (e.g. caused by the use of
uncalibrated analog output boards and the
quantification errors in the D/A- and A/D-conver-
sions) may in some case cause quite large differ-
ences in the time behaviour of the system as is
shown in Fig. 14. The smaller is the gradient of
the signal when it surpasses the trip limit the
greater is the time difference between the
expected and actual moment of time when the
trip occurs. This means that a more intelligent
comparison algorithm is needed for distinguish-
ing actual erroneous behaviour of the system from
discrepancies caused by quantification error. By
using the actual measured data from the test
object as input for the logical model the
deviations could be minimized.
The ABB-pilot example has shown that dynamic
testing is not an easy approach. This is best seen
in the interpretation of the test results. Though
the amount of test cases was small, the evaluation
of two slightly different response turned out to
be somewhat problematic. An example of this is
noticed in the evaluation of deviating outputs:
how great difference is acceptable? The problem
is identical to voting methods in diverse systems.
Thus it is reasonable to suggest that with a larger
system the approach should be more targeted to
critical or otherwise interesting portions of the
system. It also seems obvious that in later
versions of the test harness a more intelligent
response comparator will be needed.
Dynamic testing gives valuable information of
the time behaviour of the target system. This type
of test result can not be achieved by any other
means. For instance, analysis of the specification
or system design can not fully predict its time
8 CONCLUSIONS
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related behaviour. Proving of the response times
inevitably requires dynamic testing of the real
system.
The pilot system included features that were not
described in the specification for quotation
available for this study. This means that a similar
system cannot be reconstructed using only this
specification. In this case the pilot system
contains probably some sort of filtering of the
input signals that is not defined in this specifica-
tion. The design documents produced in the later
phase of the system design process would have
defined these filters, but they were not available
for this study.  The lack of requirements
traceability is a severe drawback: if specifica-
tion can not be used as a starting point for the
logical modelling, all the possible errors that have
been made during the early phases of the system
development, are missed in dynamic testing. It
is a well known fact that the origin of most of the
errors lies just in the specification and design
phases of the development process. Some
references claim that even 80 % of errors stem
from specification phase. Thus — according to
those references — most of the potential errors
can not be found in dynamic testing, if the logical
model is based on implementation docu-
mentation, i.e. the formal specification.
Therefore it is suggested that the specifications
in the future also include features like filtering.
The decisions to add new features to the system
are perhaps done during implementation (that is,
during the development of formal specification).
However, there are no obstacles in updating the
specifications after this kind of design or
implementation decisions have been made.
International norms and standards should be
developed to give more clear guidance for the
production of correct and complete
specifications.
Test case preparation and selection should be
based on the analysis of the system. Test cases
should be targeted to key areas of the system and
selected so that statistical analysis of test results
is possible.
The experiences gained in this trial testing of one
application it is clear that further development
of the test harness is still needed, especially
concerning the comparison of the actual
behaviour of the system with the expected
response provided by the logical model. The
tested application was of utmost simplicity and
more experience is still needed before the full
potential of the method and the harness can be
evaluated and the development tasks defined.
Another, more complicated target system will be
tested during the spring 1995. That test will most
certainly give a lot of new experience for that
purpose.
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TEST DATA AND RESULTS APPENDIX B
• m refers to the logical model • s refers to the pilot system
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APPENDIX B TEST DATA AND RESULTS
The graphs give the APRM time series calculated from the individual LPRM sensor signals feeded to
the logical model and the pilot system and the responses of these.
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TEST DATA AND RESULTS APPENDIX B
• m refers to the logical model • s refers to the pilot system
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APPENDIX B TEST DATA AND RESULTS
The graphs give the APRM time series calculated from the individual LPRM sensor signals feeded to
the logical model and the pilot system and the responses of these.
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TEST DATA AND RESULTS APPENDIX B
• m refers to the logical model • s refers to the pilot system
Core flow = 0.5
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APPENDIX B TEST DATA AND RESULTS
The graphs give the APRM time series calculated from the individual LPRM sensor signals feeded to
the logical model and the pilot system and the responses of these.
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TEST DATA AND RESULTS APPENDIX B
• m refers to the logical model • s refers to the pilot system
Core flow = 0.6
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The graphs give the APRM time series calculated from the individual LPRM sensor signals feeded to
the logical model and the pilot system and the responses of these.
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• m refers to the logical model • s refers to the pilot system
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The graphs give the APRM time series calculated from the individual LPRM sensor signals feeded to
the logical model and the pilot system and the responses of these.
Core flow = 0.7
E5m
0
1
0 2 4 6 8 10Time [s]
SS10m
0
1
0 2 4 6 8 10Time [s]
APRM
0,8
0,9
1,0
1,1
1,2
1,3
1,4
1,5
0 2 4 6 8 10Time [s]
SS10
E5
SS10s
0
1
0 2 4 6 8 10Time [s]
E5s
0
1
0 2 4 6 8 10Time [s]
47
STUK-YTO-TR 92
FINNISH CENTRE FOR RADIATION
AND NUCLEAR SAFETY
TEST DATA AND RESULTS APPENDIX B
• m refers to the logical model • s refers to the pilot system
Core flow = 0.8
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The graphs give the APRM time series calculated from the individual LPRM sensor signals feeded to
the logical model and the pilot system and the responses of these.
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• m refers to the logical model • s refers to the pilot system
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The graphs give the APRM time series calculated from the individual LPRM sensor signals feeded to
the logical model and the pilot system and the responses of these.
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• m refers to the logical model • s refers to the pilot system
Core flow = 1.0
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The graphs give the APRM time series calculated from the individual LPRM sensor signals feeded to
the logical model and the pilot system and the responses of these.
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• m refers to the logical model • s refers to the pilot system
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The graphs give the APRM time series calculated from the individual LPRM sensor signals feeded to
the logical model and the pilot system and the responses of these.
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